countries do intervene to restrict exports when international prices rapidly increase, for any country with a significant share of food insecure population intervening, either to contain the increase of domestic prices or to limit the effects on the poor, is a necessity restricting exports is one of the options however, by restricting its exports a country makes prices in other countries increase further (beggarthy-neighbor effect) and stimulates a domino effect involving both importers and other exporters ('prisoner's dilemma' trap) significant short and medium term indirect effects on food security export restrictions and international price 'spikes' in 2007/08 and 2010/11countries reacted to the price 'spikes' in different ways:  those who had price stabilization and safety net policies already in place activated them  many exporters introduced export restrictions  many importers reduced import protection export restrictions proved effective in reducing upward variability of domestic prices …and, symmetrically, they also made prices for cereals increase significantly more in other countries, exacerbating the impact of the crisis however, in the case of rice in 2007 they were themselves a major cause of the price 'spike' …and I am going to leave it to you to assess the probability that each of these scenarios has to materialize conclusions there is an inverse relationship between the probability of an agreement including stricter disciplines on export restrictions and the 'ambition' of these disciplines in terms of restricting the policy space of exporting countries but, if an agreement emerges in Bali… are there alternatives to a WTO agreement, i.e. an agreement within a different institutional framework (such as FAO, the G20, or ICAs)?
